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TL;DR
Trezor confirmed that three Safe 5 hardware wallets sold through former reseller CryptoBilis contained an added circuit board that copied recovery words and passphrases displayed on the device. Firmware 2.13.1, released November 11, blocks the implants Trezor has found, but cannot protect backups captured before installation; Trezor says no owners have reported losing funds.
Trezor has confirmed implants in three Safe 5 hardware wallets bought through former Southeast Asian reseller CryptoBilis. The extra circuit boards copied recovery words and passphrases shown on the devices and transmitted the information over a mobile network, according to Trezor; the company says its firmware 2.13.1 blocks the implants it has identified, but cannot protect a backup captured before the update.
Trezor said its laboratory examined one Safe 5 after a customer reported an added circuit board, and that owners later supplied photos identifying two more implanted devices. The three wallets were bought between August 20 and September 23, 2026, through CryptoBilis’s Tokopedia and Shopee stores or directly from the reseller. Trezor said the board sat between the device’s main board and screen.
According to Trezor’s analysis, the implant copied information displayed on the screen, including recovery words shown when creating a wallet backup or entered when restoring a wallet. It could also capture a passphrase if one appeared there. The implant encrypted the copied data and sent it over a mobile network to a server controlled by the attackers; if it could not connect, it retained the data and tried again. Trezor said the implant did not alter the device’s firmware or Secure Element.
Trezor released firmware version 2.13.1 on November 11 for the Safe 7, Safe 5, Safe 3 and Model T. The company says the update prevents the implants it has found from capturing information on devices running the software. Trezor reported that no owners of the three confirmed devices had reported losing funds. It said 48 CryptoBilis customers had come forward and that their devices were being checked.
Trezor Safe 5 implant · how it works
What the hidden board copies, and what the fix stops
How Trezor describes the implant it found in three Safe 5 wallets bought from CryptoBilis, and what firmware 2.13.1 changes.
Inside the device (schematic)
mobile network
Step by step
- 1Recovery words appear on the screen, when a wallet backup is created or a wallet is restored
- 2The extra board copies them, and a passphrase if one is shown. Firmware and Secure Element stay unchanged
- 3It encrypts the data and sends it over the mobile network. No connection: it keeps the data and retries
- 4Firmware 2.13.1, released Nov 11: stops the implants found so far from capturing anything
Confirmed
3 Safe 5 devices, bought Aug 20 – Sep 23, 2026 from CryptoBilis
Being checked
48 CryptoBilis buyers came forward; no tampering found at other resellers in the region
Funds lost
None reported so far, Trezor says
Source: Trezor, “Our CryptoBilis investigation: what we found and what we’ve changed”, Nov 12, 2026; Trezor firmware changelog (2.13.1, released Nov 11, 2026). Schematic drawing, not the real board layout.
Graphic: Powered by Thorsten Meyer AI
A Screen Can Expose Recovery Words
The finding targets the device’s display, a part of the hardware-wallet process users rely on to verify sensitive information away from a connected computer. If an implant records recovery words as they appear on that screen, it can compromise the backup even while the wallet’s firmware and security chip remain unchanged, according to Trezor.
That distinction affects how customers should interpret a software update. Installing version 2.13.1 addresses the identified capture method, Trezor says, but it cannot retrieve or erase information that may already have been sent. A person whose recovery words were captured could face continued risk even after updating the device. Trezor has not said that any of the three owners lost funds, and the available information does not establish that any captured data was used.
The case also highlights the role of the supply chain. The confirmed devices came through one reseller that had been removed from Trezor’s network, rather than through a finding that all Safe 5 units or all regional resellers were affected. Customers need to weigh both the device’s history and the limits of a firmware fix.
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From Reseller Warning to Lab Confirmation
Trezor said it removed CryptoBilis from its reseller network on October 9, 2026, the day Ledger began investigating customer fund losses involving hardware wallets bought from the same seller. Ledger, which had also authorized CryptoBilis, said on October 15 that it was dealing with “an attack on the distribution channel after the devices left our control.” That statement concerned Ledger devices; it does not by itself confirm losses or tampering involving Trezor wallets.
On October 28, a Trezor customer in Indonesia reported an added circuit board inside a Safe 5 bought from CryptoBilis through Tokopedia. Before its lab had examined that device, Trezor warned customers on October 30, saying it did not want to leave buyers exposed while waiting for confirmation. The company announced the laboratory finding and two additional devices on November 12. It said other devices it had examined, including devices sourced from other regional resellers, showed no evidence of tampering. Trezor is working with SEAL 911, the Security Alliance’s emergency response service.
Trezor also said it had cut its reseller network by about 80%. That is the company’s reported change to its network, not a count of affected devices. The confirmed finding remains limited to three individual Safe 5 wallets associated with CryptoBilis.
““It only listens.””
— Trezor, describing the implant’s behavior
How Many Devices Were Exposed?
The confirmed count is three individual Safe 5 devices, not three wallet models. Trezor said 48 CryptoBilis customers had come forward and their devices were being checked, but it has not provided a final result for those examinations. The company has also not reported how many other units, if any, may have been tampered with.
It is not clear whether attackers accessed or used information transmitted by the implants. Trezor said none of the three owners had reported a loss of funds, but that does not establish whether data was collected or whether it could be used later. The source material also does not identify the attackers, the server’s location, or the total number of people whose recovery information may have been exposed.
Trezor says its update stops the implants it has found. The available information does not establish whether the same protection would block a different implant design, nor does it provide an independent assessment of the company’s technical findings.
Device Checks and Recovery Precautions
Trezor says it is checking devices belonging to customers who came forward and working with SEAL 911. The next reported milestone is the outcome of those checks and any further confirmed cases. Until then, the company’s current confirmed count remains three devices.
For affected customers, the central concern is whether recovery words or a passphrase appeared on an implanted device before the update. Firmware 2.13.1 cannot undo a prior capture, according to Trezor. The supplied information does not set out a complete customer response protocol, so users should consult Trezor’s official guidance rather than assume that updating alone resolves possible prior exposure.
Trezor has not announced a final date for completing customer checks or provided a broader accounting of the investigation. Any revised device count, confirmed misuse of captured information, or additional technical findings would change the assessment of the incident.
Key Questions
How many Trezor wallets have been confirmed to contain implants?
Trezor confirmed three individual Safe 5 devices, all linked to CryptoBilis purchases. It said other devices it examined showed no evidence of tampering, while checks of devices from 48 customers who came forward were ongoing.
What information did the implant capture?
According to Trezor, it copied information shown on the device screen, including recovery words and any passphrase displayed. It encrypted the information and attempted to send it over a mobile network to a server controlled by the attackers.
Does firmware 2.13.1 protect a backup captured earlier?
No, according to Trezor. The company says version 2.13.1 stops the implants it has found from capturing information on devices running the update, but cannot protect a backup that was captured before installation.
Have customers reported losing funds?
Trezor said none of the owners of the three confirmed devices had reported losing funds. The company has not said whether attackers accessed or used any information captured by the implants.
Source: ThorstenMeyerAI.com
